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10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 11 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
 12 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)	No. CR 03-0095 WBS
14 Plaintiff,)	UNITED STATES' REPLY TO AMR MOHSEN'S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM
15 v.)	
16 AMR MOHSEN,)	Date: December 8, 2006
17 Defendant.)	Time: 10:30 a.m.
)	Courtroom D

18
19 **INTRODUCTION**

20 Defendant Amr Mohsen has filed a sentencing memorandum in which he requests the
 21 Court to sentence him to 8 years imprisonment. Mohsen also requests an evidentiary hearing on
 22 the issue of Mohsen's intended loss. For the reasons set forth below, as well as those in the
 23 government's December 1, 2006 sentencing memorandum, the government opposes both
 24 Mohsen's 8-year sentencing recommendation and Mohsen's request for an evidentiary hearing.

25 First, Mohsen's eight-year sentencing recommendation contains neither a meaningful
 26 analysis of the applicable sentencing guidelines nor an explanation for how Mohsen has reached
 27 his proposed eight-year figure. Mohsen's arson conviction (count 22) alone should result in a 60-
 28 month sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 373 which proscribes a sentence of "not more than one-half of

1 the maximum term of imprisonment...for the crime solicited” which, in this case, was arson to
2 commit a federal felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1). A violation of 18 U.S.C. §
3 844(h)(1) carries a *mandatory consecutive* sentence of ten years. Accordingly the PSR has
4 calculated that Mohsen’s sentence on count 22 should be 60 months (one-half of ten years) and
5 has recommended that the 60 months be served consecutive to the sentence on counts 1-21. *See*
6 PSR ¶ 65. Thus, Mohsen’s proposed eight-year sentence is, essentially, a recommendation of
7 three years imprisonment for all of Mohsen’s other convictions, including conspiracy; perjury;
8 obstruction of justice; mail fraud; contempt and witness tampering which would then be followed
9 by a five-year sentence on count 22. A three-year sentence for Mohsen’s mail fraud, perjury,
10 obstruction of justice, attempted witness tampering and contempt is patently unreasonable and
11 bears no relationship to either the sentencing guidelines or the principles set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
12 3553. Nor does the proposed three-year sentence for Mohsen’s convictions on counts 1-21
13 account for the fact that the Court *must* require some portion of Mohsen’s sentence on count 20
14 (contempt) to be served consecutive to the sentence on counts 1-19 because Mohsen’s contempt
15 was committed while he was on pre-trial release. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3147 *requiring* a consecutive
16 sentence for any crime committed while a person is on pre-trial release.

17 Second, Mohsen’s request for an evidentiary hearing and an additional opportunity to
18 cross-examine government trial witness Jeff Miller is yet another attempt to side-track the court
19 and postpone the day of reckoning. Jeff Miller testified during the government’s case-in-chief
20 and was extensively questioned on the issue of Mohsen’s intended loss. During the six-week
21 jury trial, the Court heard more than enough evidence regarding Mohsen’s intended loss to
22 resolve any factual disputes in the PSR. We also note that Mohsen has offered no explanation as
23 to why he should be given a second bite at the apple when he was given the opportunity for full
24 cross-examination of Jeff Miller at trial. *See* RT 180-212 (attorney Bruce Locke’s cross-
25 examination of Jeff Miller). Nor has Mohsen made any effort to explain why QuickTurn’s
26 expert’s damages figure has *any* bearing on the amount *Mohsen* intended to cause QuickTurn to
27 pay *if* QuickTurn had not ferreted out Mohsen’s fraud. Quite simply, QuickTurn was the victim
28 of Mohsen’s fraudulent scheme. The relevant and operative measure of intended loss is the

1 amount *Mohsen* intended to cause QuickTurn to pay not vice versa. All of the evidence of
2 *Mohsen*'s approximately \$70,000,000 intended loss was presented through trial exhibits and trial
3 testimony. There is no need or justification to further delay *Mohsen*'s sentencing for an
4 unnecessary evidentiary hearing.

5 ANALYSIS

6 *A. An Eight-Year Sentence Is Unreasonable*

7 *Mohsen*'s sentencing memorandum does not provide any insight into how *Mohsen*
8 arrived at his eight-year sentencing recommendation. Although the sentencing guidelines are
9 now advisory, the court must nevertheless make calculations under the guidelines and must
10 properly calculate the applicable range under the advisory guidelines. *United States v. Mohamed*,
11 459 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, *Mohsen* has not explained his view of how the
12 guidelines should be calculated, other than to object to the 17-level enhancement for loss and the
13 4-level enhancement for his role in the offense. Even if the Court were to accept *Mohsen*'s
14 argument that the loss should be calculated based upon QuickTurn's attorney's fees rather than
15 the loss *Mohsen* intended to cause QuickTurn, the resulting sentence would either (1) be
16 increased **13** levels under U.S.S.G. 2F1.1(b)(1)(N) because QuickTurn spent approximately \$4.6
17 million defending the patent lawsuit or (2) be increased **11** levels because, according to *Mohsen*,
18 QuickTurn spent approximately \$1.3 million discovering the fraud in the notebooks. *See* PSR ¶
19 58 and *Mohsen* sentencing memo pg.8. *Mohsen* provides no explanation for his conclusion that
20 the Court should find a 6-level enhancement for loss. *See* *Mohsen* sentencing memo pg. 8.

21 In the same vein, *Mohsen* objects to a 4-level enhancement for his "otherwise extensive"
22 role in the offense. Yet *Mohsen* has wholly failed to explain why document examiner David
23 Moore, ink chemist Robert Kuranz, San Jose Police Dispatcher Alma Carrillo and the attorneys
24 at Howrey & Simon (including Andy Piatnicia whose tape recorded interview with *Mohsen*
25 about the "theft" of the Notebooks from *Mohsen*'s car was played at trial for the jury) should **not**
26 be considered "unknowing" participants who unknowingly furthered *Mohsen*'s fraudulent
27 scheme. The facts at trial established by any standard of proof, including clear and convincing,
28 that the above individuals were all unknowingly recruited by *Mohsen* to help facilitate and

1 further Mohsen's fraud. These many unknowing participants, coupled with Aly Mohsen's
2 knowing participation, clearly and convincingly establish that Mohsen's role in the offense was
3 otherwise extensive.

4 *B. Burden of Proof For Sentencing Enhancements Post-Booker*

5 Mohsen spends most of his sentencing memorandum on a lengthy historical review of the
6 government's burden of proof for sentencing enhancements prior to the Supreme Court's
7 decision in *Booker*. In view of the fact that the sentencing guidelines are now advisory and serve
8 as the starting place for formulating a "reasonable" sentence (*see United States v. Mohamed*, 459
9 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 2006)), the Court can fashion a reasonable sentence under either the
10 preponderance of evidence (*see United States v. Kilby*, 443 F.3d, 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2006)) or
11 the clear and convincing standard. (*See United States v. Staten*, 450 F.3d 384, 392 (9th Cir. 2006)
12 ("In the aftermath of *Booker*, we have noted that while the preponderance of the evidence
13 standard will still generally satisfy due process concerns, a heightened burden may sometimes be
14 imposed.). In this case, we respectfully submit that the government has met its burden on all
15 sentencing enhancements, including the intended loss, under both standards.

16 The government reiterates that its basis for seeking an enhancement for intended loss of
17 more than \$40,000,000 (17 levels) is based on: (1) Government Exhibit 33A which was
18 introduced at trial and contained *Aptix's* calculation of the *compensatory* damages that
19 supposedly resulted from *Aptix's* claim that QuickTurn infringed the 069 patent; (2) Government
20 Exhibit 29 which was introduced at trial and consisted of Mohsen's phony backdated notes that
21 were supposed to represent proof by Mohsen that QuickTurn "willfully" infringed the 069 patent;
22 (3) Deposition testimony from Amr Mohsen, also introduced at trial, in which Mohsen claimed
23 to have given Keith Lobo (QuickTurn's President) notice of infringement in August 1996; (4)
24 Trial testimony of Jeff Miller, which was subject to cross-examination by Mohsen, establishing
25 that *Aptix* sought between \$22 and \$24 million in compensatory damages and intended to have
26 that amount tripled based upon *Aptix's* claim that QuickTurn "willfully" infringed the 069 patent
27 (*see* RT 167:7-168:4) and; (5) Expert trial testimony from patent expert Jay Kesan, which was
28 subject to cross-examination by Mohsen, concerning the multiplier that is used to compute

1 damages in patent infringement lawsuits. This proof satisfies both the preponderance and the
2 clear and convincing standard that Mohsen intended QuickTurn to sustain a loss of more than
3 \$40,000,000, which results in a 17-level increase to the base offense level.

4 *C. The Intended Loss Is Based Upon Mohsen's Intent, Not the Victim's Intent*

5 Amr Mohsen finds himself in the untenable position of (1) having previously lied and
6 falsified documents to exponentially increase QuickTurn's loss in the civil case (*see* Exhibit 29
7 and Mohsen deposition testimony pgs. 575-76, 648-49 and 657) and (2) scrambling to
8 retroactively minimize those damages now that Mohsen's own bogus documents and false
9 testimony will be used to calculate Mohsen's prison sentence rather than to fortify his bank
10 account. All of the documents introduced at trial by the government in support of the
11 \$70,000,000 intended loss figure were either manufactured by Mohsen or produced by Aptix to
12 QuickTurn in the civil case. Government Exhibit 29 (the phony Keith Lobo notes) was created
13 by Mohsen and was intended to falsely serve as "proof" of Mohsen's alleged notice of
14 infringement to QuickTurn. Exhibit 29 was also Mohsen's "proof" of (1) the *date* of alleged
15 notice of infringement which, as Jay Kesan and Jeff Miller testified, starts the damages clock
16 running and (2) *willfulness* which provides a basis for tripling the compensatory damages.
17 Government Exhibit 33A is Aptix's own expert (Michael Wagner) damages report. Mohsen
18 created the phony notes in Exhibit 29 to triple the compensatory damages set forth in Exhibit
19 33A. Notwithstanding all of the evidence the government presented to support the \$70,000,000
20 intended loss figure, Mohsen now argues that either (1) there was no intended loss or (2) the loss
21 should be limited to QuickTurn's attorneys' fees, but only those fees that were spent by
22 QuickTurn to ferret out Mohsen's fraud. Finally, Mohsen makes the unique, and entirely legally
23 unfounded argument, that the loss should be based upon *QuickTurn's* expert's calculations,
24 rather than on the figure Mohsen actually intended. We address each argument in turn.

25 Mohsen continues to make the argument that there is no intended loss "because Mohsen
26 was entitled to win the lawsuit on the merits." *See* Mohsen sentencing memo, pg. 9. This
27 argument is thoroughly disturbing because it reveals that Mohsen has utterly failed to
28 comprehend the true nature of the damage he caused in this case. As this Court is now well

1 aware, Mohsen’s criminal conduct sought to distort and pervert the legal process and to
2 undermine the foundation of our legal system, namely that lawsuits are decided by the fact finder
3 based upon documents that are what they purport to be and upon testimony that is truthful. Quite
4 simply, Mohsen was not entitled to “win” the lawsuit against QuickTurn by using perjured
5 testimony, sponsoring false documents and by intentionally and artificially increasing
6 QuickTurn’s potential damages to force an unfair settlement. Mohsen fully intended to bring
7 QuickTurn to financial ruin. If Mohsen had not been caught, QuickTurn could have settled the
8 lawsuit for a vastly inflated amount, which is exactly what Mohsen intended and what the
9 guidelines are designed to address.

10 Second, even if Mohsen would have won the lawsuit, which we will never know because
11 Mohsen’s misconduct prevented the lawsuit from being adjudicated on its true merits, this “fact”
12 has *no* bearing on the loss Mohsen intended to cause. Mohsen claimed, via Exhibit 33A, that
13 Aptix’s compensatory damages were between \$22 and \$24 million. Mohsen also manufactured
14 false evidence (Exhibit 29) to support Aptix’s claim that the \$22 or \$24 million compensatory
15 damages should be tripled.

16 Third, despite all of the evidence that Mohsen fabricated and that Aptix sponsored in the
17 civil case to exponentially increase the potential loss to QuickTurn, Mohsen now makes the
18 stunning argument that Exhibit 33A (Aptix’s expert compensatory damages report) “was
19 *intended* to be a sky-high, starting point for settlement negotiations—not a final damage
20 calculation.” Mohsen sentencing memo pg. 10, emphasis supplied. Separate and apart from the
21 unsupported notion that Michael Wagner, Aptix’s hand-selected expert and the author of Exhibit
22 33A, was a co-conspirator in Mohsen’s effort to defraud QuickTurn, we note that Mohsen never
23 took the position in the civil case that his own expert’s damage report should be disregarded by
24 QuickTurn. To the contrary, Mohsen affirmatively sought to inflate his recovery three-fold by
25 manufacturing phony evidence of QuickTurn’s alleged “willfulness.” We also observe that even
26 Mohsen has characterized Exhibit 33A as something that was “intended.” (“[T]he report
27 [Exhibit 33A] was *intended* to be a sky-high starting point for settlement negotiations”). *Id.* at
28 10. Mohsen cannot have it both ways. In the civil case, Mohsen sought and intended to cause

1 QuickTurn an astronomical loss. Now that he is in the criminal arena, Mohsen should not be
2 permitted to disavow his *own* intentions regarding the amount of loss. “[I]f an intended loss that
3 the defendant was attempting to inflict can be determined, this figure will be used if it is *greater*
4 *than the actual loss.*” See U.S.S.G. 2F1.1, n.8, emphasis supplied. Here, the intended loss is
5 clearly capable of determination based upon Mohsen’s own evidence and testimony. The
6 intended loss of \$70,000,000 is greater than the actual loss and should, therefore, be used in
7 calculating the loss enhancement.

8 Finally, the concept of intended loss is specifically focused on the loss that the defendant
9 intended to cause. Mohsen, however, has attempted to turn this proposition on its head by
10 suggesting that it is QuickTurn’s calculations of damages, *not* Mohsen’s, that should determine
11 the *intended* loss amount. See Mohsen sentencing memo, pg. 12. The government is unaware of
12 any authority, and Mohsen has cited none, for the proposition that the defendant’s intended loss
13 should be determined based upon the victim’s (*ie.* QuickTurn) defensive loss calculations rather
14 than upon the defendant’s offensive calculations. Intended loss is just that: the amount of loss
15 that the defendant *intended* to cause the victim.

16 *D. Mohsen Was Not Entrapped*

17 Despite having received an entrapment instruction at trial which required the government
18 to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mohsen was *not* entrapped by a government agent into
19 committing counts 21 and 22, Mohsen now argues for a downward departure from an as-of-yet
20 unspecified guideline range for “imperfect entrapment.” See Mohsen sentencing memo, pg. 15.
21 There is no factual basis for any such departure. Mohsen was firmly at the helm during his
22 attempted witness tampering and during his solicitation of an arson on David Moore’s car. The
23 Court is familiar with the videotapes (which were played at trial) of (1) Mohsen berating the
24 cooperating inmate for not making additional intimidating phone calls to the Avery-Dennison
25 employees; (2) expressing satisfaction with the photograph of the arson to David Moore’s car,
26 but reiterating his “hope” that “they got the right car”; (3) instructing the cooperating inmate to
27 make sure “Kimo” would use gasoline for the arson; (4) repeatedly harassing the cooperating
28 inmate to find someone to break into Tom Huang’s car to create credibility for Mohsen’s bogus

1 “mistaken car identity defense,” and (5) instructing the cooperating inmate to find someone to
2 track Judge Alsup’s whereabouts and determine Judge Alsup’s patterns to figure out how
3 difficult it would be to murder Judge Alsup. Mohsen’s behavior in Santa Rita jail was yet
4 another manifestation of the consistent pattern Mohsen has displayed throughout his six-year
5 criminal odyssey. Mohsen was willing to game the system and win at any cost in both the
6 criminal and civil justice arenas. Mohsen was predisposed to commit counts 21 and 22 and
7 required no inducement to do so. There is no basis for a downward departure in this case at all,
8 let alone for so-called “imperfect entrapment.”

9 *E. There Is No Basis For An Evidentiary Hearing*

10 Mohsen now requests an evidentiary hearing, ostensibly for two purposes: (1) to call
11 QuickTurn’s attorney, Jeff Miller, as an adverse witness in an attempt to establish that
12 QuickTurn’s damages expert calculated a lower damages figure than did Michael Wagner
13 (Aptix’s damages expert) and (2) to call Ken Serwin, Ph.D., to contradict *Aptix’s* own expert,
14 Michael Wagner, and to opine that the “Wagner report substantially overstates a reasonable
15 estimate of ‘intended’ loss in this case.” Mohsen sentencing memo pg. 12.

16 As an initial matter, there is no general right to an evidentiary hearing at sentencing.
17 *United States v. Kimball*, 975 F.2d 563, 568 (9th Cir. 1992), *cert. denied*, 507 U.S. 918 (1993).
18 *Cf. United States v. Real-Hernandez*, 90 F.3d 356, 362 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that there is
19 “no general right to an evidentiary hearing at sentencing” and that such hearings are
20 discretionary, not mandatory. Where the district court uses values from documents prepared by
21 the defendant, himself, it was not an abuse of discretion not to hold a hearing on the matter.
22 *United States v. Lawrence*, 189 F.3d 838, 846 (9th Cir. 1999).

23 Second, the testimony Mohsen seeks at this proposed evidentiary hearing has *no* bearing
24 whatsoever on the issue of Mohsen’s *intended* loss. Mohsen does not seek to cross-examine
25 Miller or introduce the as-of-yet incomplete Serwin report to establish that Mohsen *intended* a
26 lesser amount of financial harm to QuickTurn. Rather, Mohsen seeks to establish that the *actual*
27 loss *might* have been less than \$70,000,000 *if* the civil fact-finder had accepted the victim’s view
28 of loss rather than Mohsen’s. This proposition, however, has *nothing* to do with the issue that

1 the Court needs to resolve, namely what is the amount of loss that Mohsen *intended* to cause
2 QuickTurn *regardless* of whether that amount was realistically possible? The government does
3 not need to prove that Mohsen's intended \$70,000,000 loss was a probable, or even realistic, loss
4 figure that would have resulted from Mohsen's scheme. Rather, the government's burden is only
5 to prove what Mohsen *intended* from his scheme. Loss under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 "does not require
6 the loss the defendant intended to inflict be realistically possible." *United States v. Robinson*, 94
7 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1996). *See also, United States v. Koenig*, 952 F.2d, 267, 271 (9th Cir.
8 1991) ("If the district court chooses to calculate the intended loss, there is no requirement
9 mandating consideration of the 'probable loss' that would result from the intended plan").

10 Second, the government is unaware of any authority requiring the district court to hold an
11 evidentiary hearing solely to permit a defendant to retroactively contradict his *own* evidence of
12 loss. Mohsen's proposed hearing is unnecessary because he seeks to establish an irrelevant
13 proposition that is uncontested by the government, *ie.* that the "actual loss", if Mohsen's
14 misconduct had not been discovered, might have been less than the amount of loss that Mohsen
15 *intended*. Because the advisory guidelines specifically direct that "if an intended loss that the
16 defendant was attempting to inflict *can be determined*, this figure will be used if it is *greater* than
17 the actual loss" (*see* 2F1.1. n.8, emphasis supplied), the "actual loss" that Mohsen seeks to
18 establish in the proposed evidentiary hearing is irrelevant. In this case, the Court can determine
19 the loss Mohsen *intended* to inflict on QuickTurn from the current record. The Court does not
20 need to consider Mohsen's proposed evidence, from either further cross-examination of Jeff
21 Miller or from a newly retained damages expert, that the "actual loss" might have been less than
22 the amount Mohsen intended because the guidelines direct the Court to use the loss figure which
23 is "greater." *Id.*

24 Finally, we respectfully request that *if* the Court is inclined to hold an evidentiary hearing,
25 which we maintain is unnecessary and counterproductive to a determination of Mohsen's
26 intended loss, that any such evidentiary hearing take place at a future date to be determined based
27 upon the availability of Jeff Miller, who is currently a partner at the Orrick, Harrington law firm.

28 //

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein and in the government’s December 1, 2006 memorandum, the United States respectfully requests the Court to sentence Mohsen to 228 months imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of supervised release. The United States further requests the Court to order payment of a \$1700 special assessment and restitution to the victim, Cadence. The United States requests the Court to impose judgment and sentence without an evidentiary hearing for the reasons set forth herein.

Dated: December 5, 2006

Respectfully Submitted,

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